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Proof of AccessNetwork Fee RoutingRelease VerificationMPC Treasury SecurityPSBT SecurityNode AuthenticationRate LimitingBundle Integrity VerificationTransaction Session Reconciliation
Docs/Security & Verification/MPC Treasury Security
Security & Verification

MPC Treasury Security

Threshold signature scheme for treasury wallets. Key shares, DKG ceremonies, emergency reshare, and multi-chain signing without ever reconstructing the private key.

#MPC Treasury Security

The marketplace treasury uses a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) threshold signature scheme. The private key is split across all participating nodes and is never reconstructed at any point, not even during signing.

#Threshold Signature Scheme

Each node holds a key share derived from a Distributed Key Generation (DKG) ceremony. To produce a valid signature:

  • Each participating node computes a partial signature using its key share.
  • Partial signatures are combined via Lagrange interpolation over the signing group.
  • The result is a standard ECDSA (secp256k1 for BTC/ETH) or Ed25519 (for SOL) signature indistinguishable from one produced by a single signer.

No single node, and no subset below the threshold, can sign independently.

#Default Threshold

The threshold is set at 2/3 BFT standard (6667 basis points), with a minimum of 2 signers. For a 9-node network, the threshold is 6. This matches the Byzantine Fault Tolerance bound: the network can tolerate up to 1/3 faulty or malicious nodes.

#Two Wallet Types

WalletThresholdPurpose
Treasury67%+ of nodesPrimary marketplace funds, listing escrow
Rewards67%+ of nodesAutomated reward claim payouts

Both wallets use the standard BFT threshold (67%) to ensure consistent security guarantees across all MPC operations. This prevents a compromised rewards wallet from being exploited at a lower threshold than the treasury.

#Three MPC Ceremonies

#1. Distributed Key Generation (DKG)

Generates a shared public key and individual key shares without any trusted dealer.

text
Phase flow:
  PREPARE -> COMMITMENT -> SHARE_EXCHANGE -> VERIFICATION -> FINALIZED
  • PREPARE: coordinator broadcasts participant list and parameters.
  • COMMITMENT: each node generates a random polynomial and broadcasts commitments (SHA-256 hashes of coefficients).
  • SHARE_EXCHANGE: nodes exchange encrypted shares derived from their polynomials.
  • VERIFICATION: each node verifies received shares against published commitments.
  • FINALIZED: all nodes derive the shared public key. Individual shares are stored encrypted.

#2. Key Reshare

Redistributes key shares to a new participant set while preserving the same public key. Old shares are cryptographically invalidated.

text
Phase flow:
  PREPARE -> COMMITMENT -> SHARE_EXCHANGE -> VERIFICATION -> FINALIZED

Same phase structure as DKG, but the old share holders act as dealers for the new set. After reshare completes, the previous shares cannot produce valid partial signatures.

#3. Signing

Produces a threshold signature over a transaction digest.

text
Phase flow:
  PREPARE -> NONCE_COMMIT -> NONCE_REVEAL -> PARTIAL -> FINALIZED
  • PREPARE: coordinator distributes the message digest and selects signing participants.
  • NONCE_COMMIT: each signer generates a random nonce and broadcasts a commitment.
  • NONCE_REVEAL: nonces are revealed and verified against commitments.
  • PARTIAL: each signer produces a partial signature using their key share and the combined nonce.
  • FINALIZED: partial signatures are combined via Lagrange interpolation to produce the final signature.

#Share Storage

Key shares are encrypted at rest using AES-256-GCM. Each share file includes:

  • The encrypted share bytes.
  • A SHA-256 commitment of the plaintext share for integrity verification.
  • The DKG round identifier and participant index.

Shares are never written to disk in plaintext. The encryption key is derived from node-specific secrets.

#Emergency Reshare

An emergency reshare triggers automatically when more than 15% of nodes go offline. The protocol:

  • Detects health degradation via heartbeat monitoring.
  • Waits a 5-minute grace period to avoid resharing on transient failures.
  • If the threshold is still at risk after the grace period, initiates reshare with the currently healthy node set.
  • Old shares from departed nodes are invalidated.

This prevents a slow leak of offline nodes from eventually dropping below the signing threshold.

#Multi-Chain Wallet Support

ChainCurveSignature Scheme
Bitcoinsecp256k1ECDSA
Ethereumsecp256k1ECDSA
SolanaEd25519EdDSA

Each chain has its own MPC wallet instance with independent key shares. A single DKG ceremony produces shares for one curve. Multi-chain support requires separate ceremonies per curve.

#Key Safety Invariants

  • The full private key is never assembled in memory, on disk, or in transit.
  • Partial signatures from fewer than threshold nodes reveal nothing about the key.
  • Reshare invalidates all previous shares while preserving the public key.
  • Each ceremony phase requires explicit acknowledgment from all participants before advancing.
  • Failed ceremonies abort cleanly without leaving partial state.
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On this page

  • MPC Treasury Security
  • Threshold Signature Scheme
  • Default Threshold
  • Two Wallet Types
  • Three MPC Ceremonies
  • 1. Distributed Key Generation (DKG)
  • 2. Key Reshare
  • 3. Signing
  • Share Storage
  • Emergency Reshare
  • Multi-Chain Wallet Support
  • Key Safety Invariants